Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name:  Lydia Mechtenberg
Author-X-Name-First: Lydia
Author-X-Name-Last: Mechtenberg
Title:  Ideology Without Ideologists
Abstract:  Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Republicans
do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians
stick to the manifesto of their party.
The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon
that does not assume politicians or voters to be ideologists.
I explore an environment where both voters and politicians always
prefer the policy that is adequate to the world state but contradicts
the party manifesto over the policy that is in line with the manifesto
but not adequate. I find that nevertheless, the inefficient manifesto-driven
policy will often result from their interaction.
Besides, I show that a high degree of agreement between the
politician in office, his party basis and the voter makes efficient, informed
policy rare or even impossible. But if homogeneity of convictions
within parties is high, swing voter behavior can solve the
problem.
Length:  50 pages
Creation-Date:  2007-04
File-URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2007-021.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Number: SFB649DP2007-021
Classification-JEL: D72, D78, D82
Keywords: Information transmission, signalling, ideology, intra-party politics, political opinion.
Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:SFB649DP2007-021