

Herding of Institutional Traders

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
Herding

- Economic risk inherent in non-fundamental stock price movements → contesting the efficient markets hypothesis
- "Understanding the behavior of stock prices requires an understanding of the investment strategies of active investors", Lakonishok et. al (1992)
- **Herding** = Accumulation of investors on the same side of the market
- Exacerbate price movements, destabilization of stock prices, increasing volatility, threatening of financial market stability, e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) or Hwang and Salmon (2004)

Institutional Investors: Dominance in the stock market

- **Institutional investors:** Banks and other financial institutions

Figure 1: Share in Trading Volume DAX 30



- Daily average trading share in DAX 30 stocks over whole period: **46%**
- Pre crisis: 66%
- Post crisis: 32%

Earlier Herding Evidence

- First herding evidence: Lakonishok et al. (1992)
- Little evidence on why institutions herd
- Herding more intense in small stocks, e.g. Wermers (1999), Sias (2004), Barber (2009)
- Herding more intense in less developed markets, e.g. Lobao and Serra (2007), Voronkova and Bohl (2005)
- Herding due to common procyclical behavior, e.g. Sias, Starks and Titman (2001)

Data Problems of the Literature

Previous literature on institutional flows is handicapped

- 1 Low frequency (e.g. Walter and Weber (2006))
 - Reports if at all quarterly or semi-annually
 - Rapid changing stock market environment
- 2 No identification of trader (e.g. Barber (2009))
 - Using naive cutoff approach
 - Huge loss of information

⇒ No thorough test of institutional trading

Contribution of This Paper

This paper:

- Comprehensive data set
 - High frequency
 - Transaction data
 - Direct identification of the trader
- Determinants of herding
 - Capture changing stock characteristics
 - Resolution on covariances

Preview of Main Results

- Significant herding
- More herding for larger institutions
- Overestimation in previous studies
- More herding in large stocks
- No positive feedback trading
- Herding mainly due to common risk models

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Herding: Measurement, Data, First Results
 - Herding Measure
 - Data Problems
 - Own Dataset
 - Results on Herding
- 3 Determinants of Herding
 - Types of Herding
 - Regression Analysis
- 4 Conclusion



Herding Measure: Lakonishok et al. (1992)

Herding = Accumulation on same side of the market relative to what would be expected if trades were independent

$$HM_{it} = |br_{it} - \bar{br}_t| - E_t[|br_{it} - \bar{br}_t|]$$

- No. of trader relevant (not volume)
- br_{it} : Fraction of buyers in a specific stock i in time t
- \bar{br}_t : Average buyers ratio $\hat{=} E_t[br_{it}]$: Overall probability to buy in t for all stocks
- \overline{HM} : Mean herding measure

Data Problems of Earlier Literature:

Low Frequency

- Transactions approximated by changes in reported positions
- Positions/holdings of institutions, if at all, reported only quarterly
- Trades completed within the period are not captured
- Trades diverging in time are regarded as herding
- No resolution on determinants of herding, e.g. intra-quarter covariances of trades and returns

Data Problems of Earlier Literature:

Identification of Trader

- Using transaction data: no identification of trader
- Separate trades by size (upper cutoff), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000)
- Proxy e.g. \$50,000 = institutional, \$5,000 = retail
- Huge number of unclassified transactions, loss of information
- Institutions with superior information will break up trades to hide informational advantage

BaFin Dataset solves these Problems

- Transactions carried out on German stock exchange
- Provided by the German Federal Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
- Section 9 Securities Trading Act
- Credit Institutions and Financial Services Institutions
- Identification of *all* relevant trade characteristics
- Transactions for own account (proprietary) or on behalf of a client

BaFin Dataset: Trade Information

Fictitious Example

share	trader	date	time	size	volume	price	S/B	exchange
Adidas	Deutsche Bank	03/03/08	15:14:13	1,000	41,500	41,5	S	Ffm
Adidas	Deutsche Bank	03/03/08	15:15:16	200	8,200	41,0	S	Ffm
.
Adidas	Societe Generale	03/03/08	15:14:14	5,000	20,000	40,0	B	Xetra
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.
.
Siemens	Morgan Stanley	05/03/08	16:17:18	100	8,340	83,4	S	Xetra
.

Sample Period: Covers Up- and Downturn

July 2006 - March 2009 → $t=697$

Figure 2: Dax 30



Notes: Daily Dax returns, 01.07.06-31.03.09, Source: finanzen.net.

Has trading behavior changed since to the market turmoil?

Sample Stocks: Large and Small Stocks

- DAX30, MDAX, SDAX → 130 stocks
⇒ 88,435 observations, unbalanced panel
- 1,120 institutions (1,044 in DAX30, 742 in MDAX and 512 in SDAX stocks)
- 167,422,502 records of proprietary transactions
- Following literature using higher frequency data (e.g. Dorn et al. (2006), Campbell et. al (2005)): Calculation of daily trade imbalance for each institution

Daily Trades

Quarterly or semi-annually data provide only a crude basis in a rapid changing stock market environment!

Table 1: Average daily number of traders active

	All	DAX 30	MDAX	SDAX
07/06-03/09	25.14	50.79	23.41	10.78
<08/09/07	31.96	65.26	28.80	13.10
≥08/09/07	20.80	41.01	20.00	9.34

Trade Size

Cutoff approaches to identify institutional transactions lead to a huge loss of information!

- Lee and Radhakrishna (2000): \$50,000, \$20,000 and \$10,000 for large, medium and small stocks
- €34,000, €14,000 and €7,000 for DAX 30, MDAX and SDAX stocks
- Identification of trader is ignored
- Out of 167,422,502 records, 118,307,150 are lost

Herding Results: Data Limitations and Size Effect

Table 2: Mean Herding Measures

	Daily Herding		Quarterly Herding		Cutoff	
	<i>AllStocks</i>	<i>DAX30</i>	<i>AllStocks</i>	<i>DAX30</i>	<i>AllStocks</i>	<i>DAX30</i>
07/06-03/09	1.40 (0.02)	3.65 (0.04)	2.29 (0.15)	3.59 (0.26)	4.58 (0.02)	4.39 (0.04)
<i>Observations</i>	83,842	20,901	1,395	331	80,012	20,865
<08/09/07	1.32 (0.04)	4.35 (0.06)	1.63 (0.20)	2.98 (0.41)	2.54 (0.03)	2.47 (0.03)
<i>Observations</i>	33,257	8,427	523	123	32,751	8,426
≥08/09/07	1.60 (0.03)	3.17 (0.06)	2.69 (0.20)	3.95 (0.35)	5.99 (0.04)	5.68 (0.05)
<i>Observations</i>	50,585	12,474	872	208	47,261	12,439

▶ To MDAX and SDAX results

Building Subgroups of Traders

- 1,120 institutions = large heterogeneous group
- Theory: Herding more intense among more homogeneous institutions
- 30 most active trader = 80% of trading volume over all institutions
- Detection of intentional herding or procyclical behavior would suggest a high potential hazard for financial stability
- 40 most active German banks
- Ensuring same risk models (VaR-limits) are applied

Results for the Subgroup

Table 3: Daily Herding Measures of Subgroups

	30 Most Active Traders		40 Most Active German Banks	
	<i>AllStocks</i>	<i>DAX30</i>	<i>AllStocks</i>	<i>DAX30</i>
07/06-03/09	2.48 (0.03)	5.18 (0.06)	2.16 (0.03)	5.21 (0.05)
<i>Observations</i>	68,963	20,853	69,274	20,897
<08/09/07	2.93 (0.05)	5.84 (0.08)	1.96 (0.05)	4.78 (0.08)
<i>Observations</i>	30,362	8,427	27,635	8,425
≥08/09/07	2.14 (0.05)	4.73 (0.08)	2.39 (0.04)	5.48 (0.04)
<i>Observations</i>	38,601	12,426	41,639	12,472

▶ To MDAX and SDAX results



Summary of First Results

- Significant herding in institutional trades
- More herding for homogeneous and most professional subgroup of institutions
- More herding in DAX 30
- Lower frequency and cutoff approach overstates herding levels
- Herding in market up- and downturns

Two Types of Herding

- 1 **Unintentional Herding:** Correlated information
 - Traders examine same factors and signals
 - Similar background, qualification, interpretation (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994))

- Efficient: If driven by fundamentals
- Inefficient: Positive feedback trading

Two Types of Herding

- ② **Intentional Herding:** Less information, information uncertainty and asymmetry
 - Sentiment driven
 - Information Cascade Model (Bikhchandani et. al (1992), Avery and Zemsky (1998))
 - Reputation Based Model (Scharfstein and Stein (1990))

- Inefficient

How to Reveal Determinants of Herding

- **Information quantity and quality**
 - Market capitalization
 - Liquidity
 - Uncertainty

⇒ Intentional herding in small cap stocks
- **Reliable information, signals**
 - Price signals
 - Risk management systems

⇒ Unintentional herding

Previous Evidence: Descriptive Approaches

- Herding and stock size: Intentional herding
 - More herding in small stocks: Wermers (1999) and Lakonishok et al. (1992)
- Herding and past performance: Unintentional herding
 - Positive feedback: Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999)
 - Negative feedback: Wylie (2005)
 - No: Lakonishok et al. (1992)
- Low frequency: Only crude resolution on determinants of herding
- Problem of intra-quarter covariances

Revealing the Determinants of Herding

- Empirical proxies to measure information availability, information asymmetry or uncertainty in the market
 - Determinants that may imply a destabilizing procyclicality
- 1 Market capitalization = Information availability (Sias (2004))
 - 2 Trading volume = Information quality, asymmetry (Suominen (2001))
 - 3 Volatility = Uncertainty, risk models (Persaud (2002))
 - 4 Stock returns = Trading on price signals, procyclicality (De Long et al. (1990))

Determinants of Herding: A Panel Approach

$$HM_{it} = a + b|r_{i,t-1}| + cStd_{it} + dSize_{i,t-1} + eVol_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- $r_{i,t-t}$: Return of stock i measured from the closing prices on day $t - 1$ and $t - 2$
- $Size_{i,t-1}$: Logarithm of previous day's closing market capitalization of stock i
- Vol_{it} : Logarithm of the trading volume of stock i during t
- Std_{it} : Standard deviation of past 250 daily stock returns
- α_i, γ_t : Fixed effects, time dummies

Estimation Results

Table 4: Fixed Effects Panel Regression - Herding of 30 Most Active Trader

	HM_{it}	BHM_{it}	SHM_{it}
$Size_{i,t-1}$	0.0020 (0.0027)	0.0014 (0.0046)	-0.0039* (0.0023)
Vol_{it}	0.0069*** (0.0012)	0.0067*** (0.0017)	0.0087*** (0.0009)
$ r_{i,t-1} $	-0.0001 (0.0003)		
$r_{i,t-1}$		-0.0014*** (0.0002)	0.0008*** (0.0002)
Std_{it}	0.0031*** (0.0012)	-0.0011 (0.0012)	0.0048*** (0.0012)
Observations	65,846	34,130	31,691

Notes: The variable $Size_{i,t-1}$ is the logarithm of market capitalization, Vol_{it} is the logarithm of the trading volume of stock, $r_{i,t-1}$ is the daily stock return and $|r_{i,t-1}|$ is its absolute value. Std_{it} measures the standard deviation of past 250 daily stock returns. The statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented as ***, **, and * respectively.

Results on the Symmetric Herding Measure

- Size / market cap does not play an important role
- Volume highly significant
 - More herding in more liquid markets
 - ⇒ Unintentional herding
- Volatility highly significant
 - More herding due to increased uncertainty?
 - ⇒ Intentional herding?
- No resolution on returns

Signed Herding Measure: Capture Asymmetry

- Uncertainty would equally effect buy and sell side
- **Asymmetry** in behavior on buy and sell side?
- Positive feedback trading?
- Distinguish between buy and sell herding:
 - $BHM_{it} = HM_{it}$ if $br_{it} > \bar{br}_t$
 - $SHM_{it} = HM_{it}$ if $br_{it} < \bar{br}_t$

$$BHM_{it} = a^b + b^b r_{i,t-1} + c^b Std_{it} + d^b Size_{i,t-1} + e^b Vol_{it} + \alpha_i^b + \gamma_t^b + \epsilon_{it}^b$$

$$SHM_{it} = a^s + b^s r_{i,t-1} + c^s Std_{it} + d^s Size_{i,t-1} + e^s Vol_{it} + \alpha_i^s + \gamma_t^s + \epsilon_{it}^s$$

Results for the Signed Herding Measures

Table 5: Fixed Effects Panel Regression - Herding of 30 Most Active Trader

	HM_{it}	BHM_{it}	SHM_{it}
$Size_{i,t-1}$	0.0020 (0.0027)	0.0014 (0.0046)	-0.0039* (0.0023)
Vol_{it}	0.0069*** (0.0012)	0.0067*** (0.0017)	0.0087*** (0.0009)
$ r_{i,t-1} $	-0.0001 (0.0003)		
$r_{i,t-1}$		-0.0014*** (0.0002)	0.0008*** (0.0002)
Std_{it}	0.0031*** (0.0012)	-0.0011 (0.0012)	0.0048*** (0.0012)
Observations	65,846	34,130	31,691

Notes: The variable $Size_{i,t-1}$ is the logarithm of market capitalization, Vol_{it} is the logarithm of the trading volume of stock, $r_{i,t-1}$ is the daily stock return and $|r_{i,t-1}|$ is its absolute value. Std_{it} measures the standard deviation of past 250 daily stock returns. The statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented as ***, **, and * respectively.

Summary of Results on Signed Herding Measures

- Volatility highly significant but only for the sell side
 - Unlikely that uncertainty induces intentional herding
 - Higher sell herding due to risk models
- Return highly significant but inverse relation
 - Common reaction on price signals
 - No positive feedback trading
 - No evidence for higher sensitivity on sell side

⇒ **Unintentional herding** due to same risk models and common negative feedback trading

Conclusion

- High frequent investor level data
- Higher herding for homogeneous and most professional subgroup of institutions
- More herding in DAX 30
- Buy herding negatively related to past return
- Sell herding positively related to past return and volatility
- Herding more unintentionally
- Herding due to common risk models, that reduce diversity of decision rules

⇒ Regulators should incentive diversity of behavior through the use of different risk management systems

More Details on the Herding Measure

- Herding = Accumulation on same side of the market relative to what would be expected if trades are independent
- Buy / sell decision = Bernoulli distributed with equal success probability
→ No short selling constrains!
- n_{it} institutions trade stock i on time t
- b_{it} buy transactions, binomially distributed
- $br_{it} = \frac{b_{it}}{n_{it}}$ = Buyers ratio
- $\bar{br}_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^I b_{it}}{\sum_{i=1}^I n_{it}}$ = Overall probability to buy in t for all stocks
- Herding = Deviation from \bar{br}_t , i.e. excess dispersion of what would be expected for that time

More Details on the Herding Measure

$$HM_{it} = |br_{it} - \bar{br}_t| - E_t[|br_{it} - \bar{br}_t|]$$

- First term captures the deviation from the overall buy probability
- $E_t[|br_{it} - \bar{br}_t|]$ = Adjustment factor because buy decision is stochastic
→ More variation in br_{it} if only a few traders
- b_{it} binomially distributed with probability \bar{br}_t and n_{it} independent draws

$$E_t[|br_{it} - \bar{br}_t|] = \sum_{k=0}^{n_{it}} \binom{n_{it}}{k} \bar{br}_t^k (1 - \bar{br}_t)^{n_{it}-k} \left| \frac{k}{n_{it}} - \bar{br}_t \right|$$

Herding Results for Mid and Small Caps

Table 6: Mean Herding Measures: MDAX and SDAX

	Daily Herding		Quarterly Herding		Cutoff	
	<i>MDAX</i>	<i>SDAX</i>	<i>MDAX</i>	<i>SDAX</i>	<i>MDAX</i>	<i>SDAX</i>
07/06-03/09	1.24 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	2.14 (0.23)	1.63 (0.27)	5.27 (0.04)	3.90 (0.06)
<i>Observations</i>	33,616	29,325	534	530	32,438	26,709
<08/09/07	0.99 (0.05)	-0.59 (0.07)	1.62 (0.32)	0.82 (0.35)	2.54 (0.03)	2.47 (0.07)
<i>Observations</i>	13,005	11,825	200	200	12,857	11,468
≥08/09/07	1.41 (0.05)	0.34 (0.07)	2.46 (0.31)	2.12 (0.38)	5.99 (0.04)	4.97 (0.08)
<i>Observations</i>	20,611	17,500	334	330	19,581	15,241

MDAX and SDAX Results for the Subgroup

Table 7: Daily Herding Measures of Subgroups: MDAX and SDAX

	30 Most Active Traders		40 Most Active German Banks	
	<i>MDAX</i>	<i>SDAX</i>	<i>MDAX</i>	<i>SDAX</i>
07/06-03/09	1.18 (0.05)	1.59 (0.09)	1.22 (0.05)	0.22 (0.08)
<i>Observations</i>	31,668	16,442	31,630	16,747
<08/09/07	1.78 (0.07)	1.85 (0.12)	1.25 (0.07)	0.14 (0.12)
<i>Observations</i>	12,749	9,186	12,072	7,138
≥08/09/07	0.76 (0.07)	1.25 (0.14)	1.21 (0.07)	0.50 (0.11)
<i>Observations</i>	18,919	7,256	19,558	9,609

▶ Back

Buy and Sell Herding in the Subgroup

Table 8: Daily Signed Herding Measures for 30 Most Active Traders

	All Stocks			DAX 30		
	<i>HM</i>	<i>BHM</i>	<i>SHM</i>	<i>HM</i>	<i>BHM</i>	<i>SHM</i>
07/06-03/09	2.48 (0.03)	2.67 (0.05)	2.30 (0.05)	5.18 (0.06)	5.28 (0.08)	5.08 (0.08)
<i>Observations</i>	68,963	35,806	33,130	20,853	10,692	10,154
<08/09/07	2.93 (0.05)	3.55 (0.07)	2.15 (0.08)	5.84 (0.08)	6.26 (0.12)	5.35 (0.12)
<i>Observations</i>	30,362	16,868	13,494	8,427	4546	3,881
≥08/09/07	2.14 (0.05)	1.87 (0.07)	2.41 (0.07)	4.73 (0.08)	4.55 (0.12)	4.92 (0.12)
<i>Observations</i>	38,601	18,938	19,636	12,426	6,146	6,273

Diagnostic Tests: Panel Regression

Table 9: Fixed Effects Panel Regression - Diagnostics: 30 Most Active Trader

	HM_{it}	BHM_{it}	SHM_{it}
<i>Wooldridge</i>	$F = 0.346$ ($Prob > F = 0.5573$)	$F = 0.377$ ($Prob > F = 0.5402$)	$F = 0.385$ ($Prob > F = 0.5359$)
<i>Cook – Weisberg</i>	$\chi^2 = 3383.14$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0000$)	$\chi^2 = 4924.52$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0000$)	$\chi^2 = 1290.95$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0000$)
<i>Sargan – Hansen</i>	$\chi^2 = 10.343$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0350$)	$\chi^2 = 11.122$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0252$)	$\chi^2 = 14.026$ ($Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0072$)
<i>Observations</i>	65,846	34,130	31,691

Notes: The table reports test statistics and p-values in parentheses. *Wooldridge* and *Cook – Weisberg* are tests on serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of error terms. *Sargan – Hansen* displays the overidentification test on the independence of random effects.

- Fixed effects model, within estimator (OLS)
- No endogeneity, no serial correlation
- Heteroscedasticity → robust standard errors

Estimation Results for the Signed Herding Measures

Table 10: Fixed Effects Panel Regression - Herding of 40 Most Active German Banks

	HM_{it}	BHM_{it}	SHM_{it}
$Size_{i,t-1}$	0.0028* (0.0016)	0.0058 (0.0040)	0.0104*** (0.0032)
Vol_{it}	0.0122*** (0.0006)	0.0170*** (0.0018)	0.0083*** (0.0015)
$ r_{i,t-1} $	0.0006** (0.0002)		
$r_{i,t-1}$		-0.0004** (0.0002)	0.0003* (0.0001)
Std_{it}	0.0015** (0.0007)	-0.0018 (0.0012)	0.0022** (0.0010)
Observations	65,846	34,130	31,691

Notes: The variable $Size_{i,t-1}$ is the logarithm of market capitalization, Vol_{it} is the logarithm of the trading volume of stock, $r_{i,t-1}$ is the daily stock return and $|r_{i,t-1}|$ is its absolute value. Std_{it} measures the standard deviation of past 250 daily stock returns. The statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented as ***, **, and * respectively.